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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM D. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ROBERT CRAIL, HENRY M.
SCHEURN and DANIEL S.
BUSHNELL,
Defendants and Respondents.

No.
9291

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Respondents entered into a Stipulation concerning
the Statement of Facts and issues raised which was intended
to be in lieu of any other statement of the case. For this reason,
it is felt that it was unnecessary for the Appellant to review
the pleadings and allegations in connection with the First
Cause of Action. Also, certain statements contained in the
Appellant's Statement of the Case have not been determined;
more particularly, on page 2 it states that the stock of Pru-
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dential was in fact worthless, which has not been determined.
However, since the stipulated statement of facts is also set
out in the Appellant's Brief, it is deemed unnecessary to further
discuss these issues.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE STOCK ISSUED BY PRUDENTIAL OIL & MIN~
ERALS COMPANY WAS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE
SECURITIES LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
A. Case Authority.
B. Statutory Construction.
C. Utah Attorney General Opinions.
D. Practical Accepted Interpretation.

POINT II
THE APPELLANT IS BOUND BY ITS STIPULATION
THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE STOCK WAS HAN ISO~
LATED TRANSACTION" AND MAY NOT NOW RAISE
THAT ISSUE ON APPEAL.

POINT III
THE ISSUANCE OF THE STOCK BY PRUDENTIAL
OIL & MINERALS COMPANY WAS ALSO EXEMPT AS
AN ISSUANCE TO A CORPORATION.

4
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POINT IV
1'HE APPELLANT CANNOT QUALIFY UNDER THE
STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION EVEN IF THE SALE
WERE UNAUTHORIZED AND HIS APPEAL SHOULD
THEREFORE BE DISMISSED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STOCK ISSUED BY PRUDENTIAL OIL & MINERALS COMPANY WAS NOT IN VIOLATION OF THE
SECURITIES LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Since the Appeal raises the single question of whether the
issuance of the stock was an isolated transaction exempt by
virtue of the Securities Law, it is felt that the Statute involved
should be specifically indicated.
Section 61-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in part provides
as follows:
((SALES EXEMPTED FROM CHARTER.-Except
as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this
chapter shall not apply to the sale of any security in
any of the following cases:
3) An isolated transaction in which any security
is sold, offered for sale, subscription or delivery by the
owner thereof, or by his representative for the owner's
account; such sale or offer for sale, subscription or de·
livery not being made in the course of repeated and
successive transactions of a like character by such owner
or on his account by such representative, and such
owner or representative not being the underwriter of
such security. The provisions of this subdivision shall
t t (
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not apply in any case of sale where the issuer shall
have taken the entire stock of a company in payment
for mining claims, patent rights, copyrights, trademarks, process, lease, formula, oil lease, good will or
any other property right or any other tangible or intangible asset which may be construed as a promotion
interest, or where funds receivable from the sale of
such security may be used directly or indirectly for
development purposes.''
A. Case Authority:
There have been a few cases construing this prov1s1on;
however, again it becomes a matter of statutory construction
of the particular statute involved. An early annotation contained in 87 ALR 42, involving Blue Sky Laws has not been
supplemented or superseded concerning the issues involved
in this discussion. There appears to be no Utah case which
discusses this provision involving the issues herein raised. Most
of the cases from other jurisdictions involved a discussion of
this provision as to the questi9n of whether the statute was
constitutional and most courts held that it was. However,
in the case of People v. Pace, 73 Cal. App. 548, 238 Pac. 1089,
the law was held unconstitutional as being a restriction upon
the rights of ownership. In Brannan, Beckham & Co. v.
Ramsaur, Georgia 1930, 152 S.E. 282, 287, the court apparently had this issue presented to it but felt that a determination was not necessary in making its decision of that case.
In so doing the court stated as follows:
Uin these circumstances the sale could not be exempted under Section 9 ( 1), irrespective of whether it
was an isolated transaction as to the owner. In this
view, it is unnecessary to determine whether an owner

6
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who is also the issuer could claim the exemption provided by Section 9 ( 1) .
''What we hold is that, whether an owner be the
issuer or not, a sale made in his behalf by a regular
broker or dealer is not an isolated transaction, since it
was necessarily made in the course of repeated and
successive transactions of a similar nature by such representative of the owner.''
In the early case of Smith v. Crawford, Kan. 1929, 15
S.W. 2d., 249, the court does make a distinction as between
the corporation and the stockholder owner. However, it appears that there are peculiarities in the Kentucky law which
makes this case distinguishable. In checking II Ken. Rev. St.
Sec. 292.030, Exempt Transactions, the isolated transaction
section is the same but there does not appear to be an individual owner exemption. Although Notes and Annotations to
Ken. Rev. St. 1944 Chapter 292 traces the legislation history
of the section it doesn't show the exact status of the law as it
\vas in 1929 when the case was divided.
Although the case cited in one of the opinions of the Utah
Attorney General may be distinguished because of the statute
involved the court in Ersted vs. Hobart Howry Company,
299 N.W. 66, 68, stated as follows:
Ctit is immaterial whether the corporation or the
defendant Wilson was the owner of the shares of
stock acquired by the plaintiff or whether he was acting
for himself or the corporation. Under the evidence, the
sale of stock to the plaintiff was an isolated sale, not
made in the course of repeated and successive sales of
a similar nature and the prohibition of the statute did
not apply to the transaction.''
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The Utah cases cited by the Appellant, more particularly
those shown on Pages 10 and 11 of its brief; namely, Buttrey
vs. Guaranteed Securities Company, (1931) 78 Utah 39; 300
Pac. 1040; Hansen vs. Abraham Irrigation Company, 25 Pac.
2nd 76; and Harper vs. Tri-State Motors, 58 Pac. 2nd 18, are
not factually in point, nor do they raise or discuss the issue
of Iaw here presented. Therefore, since there are no cases issued
by the Utah Supreme Court construing these provisions the
issue becomes one of first impression and becomes primarily a
matter of statutory construction, taking into consideration the
construction placed thereon by opinions of the Utah Attorney
General and the practical accepted construction placed thereon
by the members of the Bar of the State of Utah.
B. Statutory Construction.
It is the position of the Appellant that a corporation is
not the owner of authorized unissued stock and, therefore, this
exemption is not available to a corporation, but rather is available to the stockholders who own the stock. Although certain
terms are defined by the statute, the word (towner" is not so
defined. In Section 61-1-4 the word ((person" shall include a
natural person, a corporation created under the laws of this
state * * * * , a partnership, an association, a joint stock
company, a trust, and any. unincorporated organization.
In the late 1920's there was considerable activity involving
the promotion, sale, and distribution of stocks leading up to
the .crash which occurred in 1929. Other states enacted laws
which were similar to the Securities Law in the State of Utah.
More particularly, such a law was enacted in the following
states: Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Penn-

8
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sylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. However, in
checking the statutes in some of these states, there are various
changes in connection with the isolated transaction provision.
The last clause of the first sentence of the Utah Law limits
the exemption by stating:
((And such owner or representative not being the
underwriter of such a security.''
In some states this restriction is broader in that it restricts
the exemption by providing that it shall not apply to tcthe
issuer or underwriter of such a security.'' Since the word issuer,
which would clearly apply to the corporation, was specifically
eliminated it is only logical that the legislature intended not
to so limit the exemption as not applying to the corporation.
Further, it may be argued if the word issuer was included
in the restriction on the exemption, the definition of the word
issuer as contained in sub-paragraph 5 of Section 61-1-4,
Utah Code Annotated, is broad enough to include any private
person who is the owner of the securities received from the
corporation and, therefore, such an interpretation would also
prohibit this exemption from being available to certain private
persons and would in effect render the exemption of no effect.
There is an additional restriction on the use of the exemption which further makes it clear that the legislature intended
that this exemption would normally be available to the corporation. After setting out the exemption, the Section provides further as follows:
((The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply
in any case of sale where the issuer shall have taken
the entire stock of a company in payment for mining
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claims, patent rights, copyrights, trademarks, process,
lease, formula, oil lease, good will or any other property right or any other tangible or intangible asset which
may be construed as a promotion interest, or where
funds received from the sale of such security may be
used direct! y or indirect!y for development purposes.))
It is clear from the foregoing part of the law that the
legislature felt it was necessary in certain circumstances to
restrict this exemption so far as the issuer, or corporation,
was concerned. If the Section was not intended to apply to
the Company since it was not the owner of its securities, then
there would be no need for this additional restriction.
Looking further at the law as a whole, it will appear that
the strained construction maintained by the Appellant would
be inconsistent with such law. The Appellant maintains that
this exemption is only for the individual stockholder rather
than the company. However, if this contention is valid, the
exemption contained in subparagraph (9) of the same section
is not necessary. Part of that sub-paragraph (9) is as follows:
(( ( 9) The sale, assignment, transfer or exchange by
a natural person of any security issued and delivered
by a corporation which at the time of such issue is
lawfully qualified to do business in this state and at
the time of such sale, assignment, transfer or exchange
is in actual bona fide existence and actually engaged
in the transaction of the principal business provided for
by its Articles of Incorporation, if such natural person
is a resident citizen of this state and the bona fide owner
of such security * * * ."
It is clear that the foregoing is intended to cover the
individual stockholder. It would be unnecessary to have this
provision if the isolated sale exemption as contained in sub-

10
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paragraph 3 were to apply to the individual stockholder as
now contended by the Appellant. Since the Legislature did
include the individual stockholder exemption contained in
sub-paragraph 9, it is the normal statutory construction to
conclude that some different exen1ption must have been intended by ((isolated transaction" provisions of sub-paragraph 3.
In considering the purpose for the enactment of such
laws, as will be more thoroughly discussed under Attorney
General opinions, it is evide~t that the law was intended to
protect the public generally, and that no such protection was
intended or felt necessary in the situation of the company
issuing stock not involving public offerings.
The case law in the State of Utah does take the position
that the Securities Law will be strictly construed. Guarantee
Mortgage Co. vs. Wilcox, 62 Utah 184, 218 Pac. 133; Miller
v. Stewart, 69 Utah 250, 253 Pac. 900; Willis vs. Spring Canyon
Coal Co., 4 Utah 2d, 211.
The isolated sale exemption was not restricted by the
Legislature as against the issuer which would include the
company as was done by other states in enacting comparable
laws; the individual stockholder trading his stock is exempt
by sub-paragraph 9 of the same section of the law, and it is,
therefore, unnecessary to contend that the isolated sale exemption was intended to only apply to such individual stockholder; the isolated sale exemption specifically restricts the
use of the exemption by the issuer in certain circumstances,
thus indicating that the exemption is available in the normal
circumstances, which would be the facts of this case; the law
was intended to protect the public from public sales of stock;

11
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and since the cases of the State of Utah have indicated that
the law shall be strictly construed, it is therefore submitted
that on the issue of statutory construction alone the holding
of the Trial Court to the effect that this exemption was available to Prudential Oil & Minerals Company under the facts
of this case should be affirmed.
C. Utah Attorney General 0 pinions
The Securities Commissioners in the past have requested
opinions concerning the availability of this exemption from
the Utah Attorney General's Office. One of such opinions was
issued on May 15, 1942, and is set forth in the appendix to this
Brief. The distinction which the Appellant is attempting to
assert on this appeal was not made by the Attorney General
in that opinion. In fact, after a fairly lengthy discussion the
Utah Attorney General quoted in part as follows:
((In the opinion of the General Counsel of the Securities & Exchange Commission, released January 4, 1935,
it was held that if the size of the offering, or the number
of units offered is so small that there is very little chance
of repeated and successive transactions, and there would
be a little probability of a distribution of the securities
to the public generally and such an offering may only
terminate in an isolated transaction. In considering the
manner of offering the security, if the issuer enters
into a few transactions with particular persons, the few
transactions may be placed in the realm of isolated
transactions more definitely than in the situation where
the issuer engages a dealer or other machinery for the
sale and distribution of the securities rather than by
direct negotiation." (Emphasis added.)
The Utah Attorney General therefore makes the analogy
that the isolated transaction provision is comparable to the
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exemption in the U. S. Securities and Exchange Act of 1933,
\vhich exempts issues not involving a public offering. When
the Attorney General talks about issuings and distributions,
they are talking about stock being sold by the company and,
therefore, they are taking the position that for this exemption
the company is the owner of authorized unissued stock of the
company. When one considers the purpose and intent of the
legislation, it is clear that such a construction is the only valid
one.
In December, 1946, the Attorney General issued another
opinion specifically discussing the issue of whether the issuance
by the Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company of 5% debentures would be exempt under this provision. The precise issue
was there raised as to whether the corporation could be an
owner of securities issued by it and could claim the isolated
sale exemption of sub-paragraph 3. It cannot be contended any
more in this case than in the factual situation discussed by
the Attorney General that the corporation is not the type of
owner intended to be exempt under the provision. A 5%
debenture is not any more owned by the corporation than
the authorized unissued stock of the company. Yet, the
Attorney General held in that opinion that the exemption
was available to the company. A copy of that opinion is also
set out in the appendix. An excerpt from that opinion 1s as
follows:
nThis act was obviously made for the purpose of
protecting the public against the public offering for
sale of securities which do not offer a sound investment.
The isolated transactions exception was included because the Legislature evidently felt that where an offer
was to be made only to a few individuals and not to the
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general public, such individuals would probably be in
a better position than would the state to determine
the backing of the particular security involved." (Emphasis added.)

The part of the quotation from the opinion italicized
referring to an offer being made under the circumstances can
only be intended to mean an offer being made by the company.
A debenture is a security. Stock of a company is a security. The
debenture does not become valid until it has been delivered.
Yet, in this case, the company has been held to be the owner
of that debenture. Likewise, the company is the owner of its
unauthorized unissued stock.
A reading of these opinions, as well as others issued by
the Utah Attorney General's Office, will indicate that the
narrow construction now contended by the Appellant has not
been adopted by that office, and should not be adopted by this
court.

D. Practical Accepted Interpretation.
The Trial Court ruled that the isolated ·sale exemption
was applicable to Prudential Oil & Minerals Company under
the facts of this case. Judge Stewart M. Hanson was an active
member of the Utah Securities Commission during the socalled uranium boom when there was considerable activity
involving that department. Consequently, it can be assumed
that he became rather familiar with the law and the interpretation being placed thereon. Certainly his experience in that
field, as well as being a practicing attorney, and now a District
Judge should be given considerable weight by this court. It
is submitted that most of the practicing attorneys in the State
of Utah have relied upon the Attorney General's opinions

14
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and have permitted, advised, and counseled corporations to
issue stock in isolated transactions without securing prior
approval from the Utah Securities Commission. In the case of
Bateman vs. Board of Examiners, 7 Ut. 2d 221, 234; 332 P.2d
381, 390, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
~~were

we interpreting the statutes and constitutional
provisions relating to the Board of Examiners for the
first time we might br more impressed by arguments
proposed by Education. However, history and experience have always been the very bone and sinew of the
law. As stated by the great Justice Holmes: ~The life
of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.' "
The narrow construction contended for by the Appellants
\vould seem to require that even the stock issued by the company after its immediate incorporation to its incorporators
and initial subscribers would not be exempt and, therefore,
would require Securities Commission approval. Such an interpretation would seriously impede the business pursuits of the
State of Utah and complicate the corporate practice, both for
attorneys and the public generally. Such was not the intent
of the Legislature in enacting such a law, but rather as cited
and indicated by the Attorney General, it was intended to
protect the public where public sales and offering of stock
were contemplated.

POINT II
THE APPELLANT IS BOUND BY ITS STIPULATION
THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE STOCK WAS (IAN ISOLA TED TRANSACTION" AND MAY NOT NOW RAISE
THAT ISSUE ON APPEAL.
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The Appellant now seeks for the first time on appeal to
raise the issue of whether the issuance of Prudential Oil &
Minerals Company was ((an isolated transaction." At the time
of the Pre-Trial on September 29, 1959, (R. 9), Mr. Child
stipulated as follows:
ccln explanation of the plaintiff's complaint herein
the plaintiff does not claim that these defendants
participated in the issuance or offering of any other
stock in this corporation; to-wit, the Prudential Oil and
Mineral Company, other than the issuance of the stock
to Fred B. Grube and W. D. Johnson, the plaintiff
herein, and that this was a single transaction in stock
for these 18 mining claims."
There were two additional Pre-Trial Orders issued after
this date, one on March 29, 1960 (R. 21-24) and April26, 1960,
(R. 25-26). This stipulation was not subsequently changed. The
issue was submitted on written briefs to the Trial Court
based upon this stipulation of facts by counsel for the Appellant.
Counsel should not now, therefore, be permitted to raise, or
challenge this issue for the first time on appeal. The stock issued
to Fred B. Grube, as well as toW. D. Johnson, was all handled
in connection with the same transaction; more particularly, a
conveyance was received from one of the Grube associates
clearing title to the property, and stock was issued for equipment used and then on the property, as well as the 18 mining
claims. An Attorney General's opinion has ruled that even
though the stock may be issued to more than one person, this
would not render the issuance other than an isolated transaction if it arose out of the same negotiation involving the
same parties. Factually it was an isolated sale and ethically
counsel for the Appellant should not now attempt to change

16
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the issues upon which it stipulated at the time of Pre-Trial
and which is contained in the stipulated statement of facts now
presented to this court.
POINT III
THE ISSUANCE OF THE STOCK BY PRUDENTIAL
OIL & MINERALS COMPANY WAS ALSO EXEMPT AS
AN ISSUANCE TO A CORPORATION.
As a result of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law made by the Court subsequent to the dismissal of the
second cause of action involving the alleged illegal issuance
of stock, it would appear that a second exemption is available to the Respondents to cover the issuance of said stock
by the company. The Court in its decision stated:
((THE COURT FINDS that the Iowa corporation
owned the 18 claims legally and equitably and that
the plaintiff was a stockholder. Plaintiff gave no consideration for the Prudential stock, personally, although
he took the stock in his own name.
((Said stock apparently belonged to the Iowa corporation. The plaintiff, in this way, acquired the 40,000
shares of Prudential stock that belonged to the Iowa
corporation. Plaintiff was not a party personally to the
contract of exchange, and produced no evidence of
being authorized to take title in himself for the stock."
Based upon such factual determination, it would appear
that the Appellant held the stock as constructive trustee for
the benefit of Empire Mining Company, and that in fact, the
Empire Mining Company was the equitable owner of the stock.
Section 61-1-6 of Utah Code Annotated enumerates exemptions
from the law. Sub-paragraph 5 is as follows:
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(<The sale, transfer or delivery to any bank, savings
institution, trust company or insurance company, 01'
to any corporation or to any broker or dealer; provided
that such broker or dealer is actually engaged in buying
and selling securities as a business." (Emphasis added).
Since the issuance of the stock was in consideration of
assets exchanged to Empire Mining Corporation and the
stock ~(belonged to the Iowa corporation," it would appear
that this issuance of stock was an issuance to a corporation
and, therefore, is exempt under the foregoing section.
POINT IV
THE APPELLANT CANNOT QUALIFY UNDER THE
STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION EVEN IF THE SALE
WERE UNAUTHORIZED AND HIS APPEAL SHOULD
THEREFORE BE DISMISSED.
Subsequent to the Trial Court dismissing the second cause
of action on the basis that the issuance of the stock was exempt,
as discussed above, another division of the Trial Court litigated
certain factual issues which would show that the Appellant
could not qualify under the statutory cause of action set forth
in the second cause of action even if it had not been dismissed.
In order to better understand the issues litigated by the
Trial Court and upon which Findings of Fact were made, it
is necessary to review briefly the nature in which this action
was commenced. Initially the suit was brought by W. D.
Johnson as Trustee for the stockholders of Empire Mining
Company. Empire Mining Company was alleged to be the
owner of the claims which were issued to Prudential Oil &
Minerals in exchange for stock. Thereafter a proposed amend-
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ment to the pleadings was filed by the Appellant, wherein he
sought to bring the action nindividually and as assignee of
Empire Mining Corporation." In the pleadings it was alleged
that the title of the company to the claims had been assigned to
the Appellant. A first amended complaint was then filed in
the name of the Appellant and the pleadings alleged that the
properties were jointly owned by the Appellant and the Empire
Mining Company. A second amended complaint was then
filed in which the Appellant appeared as a party and Empire
Mining Corporation. Finally a third amended complaint was
filed in the individual name of the Appellant, wherein he
alleged he was the owner of the 18 mining claims. At all
points in the pleadings the real party in issue was raised by
the Respondents. After three pre-trial hearings and pre-trial
orders, the issue of whether the Appellant was the real party
in interest and had any substantial interest, or title to the
mining claims was tried before the Court. An extended trial
was had and a considerable number of documents were introduced in evidence, as well as considerable oral testimony.
After the extended trial and considerable argument by
counsel for the respective parties, the Trial Court rendered
a decision dated and filed May 27, 1960, which is part of the
Supplemental Record on Appeal. The Court in its own memorandum decision made the following statements:
nThe plaintiff testified that title to the 18 claims was
in the Iowa corporation until the exchange with Prudential. He also testified that he was the Iowa corporation, and that the Iowa corporation only held the
stock for the plaintiff's benefit.
•cTHE COURT FINDS that the Iowa corporation
owned the 18 claims legally and equitably and that the
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plaintiff was a stockholder. Plaintiff gave no consideration for the Prudential stock, personally, although
he took the stock in his own name.
((Said stock apparently belonged to the Iowa corporation. The plaintiff, in this way, acquired the 40,000
shares of Prudential stock that belonged to the Iowa
corporation. Plaintiff was not a party personally to the
~ontract of exchange, and produced no evidence of
being authorized to take title in himself for the stock.
UThe plaintiff testified, in effect, that he put the title
to the claims in the Iowa corporation to make it difficult for Grube-Harman Mining Company to press
their claims, and also for the reason that there might
be some need to probate his estate, if he died with the
claims in his name.
((The Iowa corporation issued its stock for said
claims. It appears that the Iowa corporation was not
set up as a Trustee in any respect, but was being held
out to the world as the owner, legally and equitably,
of said 18 claims."

*

*

((THE COURT FINDS that the plaintiff had no
interest in the Iowa corporate assets, except that of a
stockholder, and that the Iowa corporation had both
legal and equitable title to the 18 claims."

*

*

*

((THE COURT FINDS that the plaintiff is not the
real party in interest. The case is dismissed with prejudice on the findings that the Plaintiff has no cause for
action. The Court does not determine who does have a
cause for action.''
Thereafter proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law were prepared and objections were raised thereto. An
amended set of Findings were then prepared, and again objec-
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tions were made and argument was had in each case. Finally
the third set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
signed by the Court, but even then objection was made by
the Appellant and after further argument, one paragraph of
these Findings was deleted. In essence the Court finally found
that the Empire Mining Company held the title to the property,
and was either a valid corporation or a de facto corporation,
but in any event the Appellant was estopped to challenge the
validity of the corporate existence of Empire Mining Company. The Appellant on the other hand was just a stockholder
of Empire Mining Company, which owned legal title to the
18 mining claims, and which company conveyed the claims
in exchange for stock of Prudential Oil & Minerals Co. The
Court's Conclusions of Law in part is as follows:
'' 5. The plaintiff is not the real party in interest of
the first cause of action in the above-entitled law suit
since he did not individually own said 18 mining claims,
and if any fraud were perpetrated it was not against
the plaintiff causing him to depart with any valuable
consideration to his detriment/' (Emphasis added).
(See Supplemental Record on Appeal.)
The second cause of action is a statutory cause of action
predicated upon Section 61-1-25, Utah Code Annotated, which
in part provides as follows:
"Sales in violation of chapter-Remedies-Liability
-Limitation of action-Every sale or contract for sale
made in violation of any of the provisions of this
chapter shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser, and the person making such sale or contract
for sale and every director, officer or agent, for such
seller who shall have participated or aided in any way
in making such sale shall, upon tender to the seller of
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the securities sold or of the contract made, be jointly
and severally liable to such purchaser for the full
amount paid by him. (Emphasis added.)
Assuming for the sake of this argument that there was
a violation of the law and that the officers of Prudential are
jointly and severally liable, it is submitted that their liability is
rr to such purchaser for the full amount paid by him.n In this
instance, in view of the Findings made by the Trial Court, it
is obvious that this Appellant paid no consideration for the
stock, and, therefore, he has not been damaged and the issues
raised on the Appeal are moot questions.
1 AM. JUR. 424, Actions, Section 31, provides in part as
follows:
CCWrong Without Damage.-As a necessary corollary
of the rule that wrong and damage must concur, it is
a maxim of the law that wrong without damage, or
injura absque damno, does not constitute a good cause
of action, as the law furnished a remedy only for such
wrongful acts as result in injury."
67 C.J.S. 899, Parties, Section 6, provides in part as
follows:
{(Rights may not be enforceable except in the name
of the injured party, so that one who sues in his own
name must ordinarily show an injury to himself."
COne without pecuniary loss has no judicial standing
in the courts." Norah vs. Crawford, La. 49 So. 2d 751.
c

Since the Appellant has not appealed from the Findings
of the Trial Court that he did not depart with any valuable
consideration to his detriment, such a finding is res judicata
and binding on the Appellant. The Utah Supreme Court in
Mathews vs. Mathews, 1942, 132, P.2d 111, 114, stated:
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··The foundation principle upon which the doctrine
of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once;
that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the
judgment of the court so long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties."
Since the Appellant has no pecuniary interest and that
issue has been finally determined against him, and since by
the very wording of the statutory cause of action which he
attempts to assert, his only recovery would be for consideration
paid by him, it is respectfully submitted that the appeal should
be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court has held that the issuance of the stock
was an exempt transaction since it was an isolated transaction
within the 1neaning of the Securities Law. The statutory construction, Attorney General's opinions, and the practical
accepted interpretation placed on the law by the Securities
Commission and the Attorneys of the State warrant the affirming of such a holding. There is an additional exemption in
that the stock was in essence issued to a corporation. Even,
however, if there was a violation of the law the Appellant
cannot comply with the cause of action created by the statute.
Therefore, the Court should either rule that the sale was exempt,
or dismiss the appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
BUSHNELL, CRANDALL & BEESLEY
GORDON I. HYDE
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents
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APPENDIX
THE STATE OF UTAH
Office of the Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah
May 15, 1942
Grover A. Giles
Attorney -General
S. D. Huffaker
Deputy Attorney General

A. John Brennan
Zar E. Hayes
A. U. Miner
Calvin L. Rampton
Herbert F. Smart
Assistants

Department of Business Regulation
Securities Commission
BUILDING
Attention Lawrence Taylor, Director
Gentlemen:
By your letter May 6, 1942, you have requested the opinion
of this office in interpretation of the provisions of Section
81-1-6(3), Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, pertaining to exemption of securities from registration when sold in isolated
transactions. The subject section is worded as follows:
((An isolated transaction in which any security is sold,
offered for sale, subscription or delivery by the owner
thereof, or by his representative for the owner's account; such sale or offer for sale, subscriptions or delivery not being made in the course of repeated and
successive transactions of a like character by such owner
or on his account by such representative, and such
owner or representative not being the underwriter of
such security. The provisions of this subdivision shall
not apply in any case of sale where the issuer shall
have taken the entire stock of a company in payment
for mining claims, patent rights, copyrights, trademarks, process, lease, formula, oil lease, good will or
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any other property right or any other tangible or intangible asset which may be construed as a promotion
interest, or where funds received from the sale of such
security may be used directly for development purposes."
At the outset, it may be pertinent to note that not only
does the section refer to isolated transactions, but also further
qualifies the exemption by providing that such sales shall not
be made in the course of repeated and successive transactions
of a like character. This phraseology may, in some instances,
be questioned from the consideration of vagueness. However,
when applied to particular facts and circumstances, the portent
or its meaning resolves itself into more definite form and the
ordinary issuer or dealer can understand therefrom what he
is permitted to do and what he is forbidden to do.
In the case of Kneeland vs. Emerton, 280 Mass. 371, 183
N.E. 155, the Court made these very interesting comments:
Sales of securities manifestly constitute the (transactions'. The words (repeated and successive' are used by way
of contrast to the word (isolated' employed earlier in the same
sentence. In such context an (isolated' sale means one standing
alone, disconnected from any other, and (repeated and successive' mean transactions undertaken and performed one after
the other. We think that two sales of securities, made one
after the other within a period of such reasonable time as to
indicate that one general purpose actuates the vendor, and that
the sale promote the same aim and are not so detached and
separated as to form no part of a single plan, would be (repeated and successive transactions'. The term (reasonable time',
which is necessarily implied in that connection from the words
(I

•••
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of the statute, has no fixed and unvarying definition, but it
is a term well known to the common law and has a long history
in judicial decision. Seaver v. Lincoln, 21 Pick. 267; Howe
v. Taggart, 133 Mass. 284, 287; Campbell v. Shoriskey, l/0
Mass. 63, 67, 48 N.E. 1070; Lydig v. Breman, 177 Mass. 212,
219, 53 N.H. 696; Plymouth Country Trust Co. v. Seanlan,
227 Mass. 71, 116 N.E. 468. Thus it is ta well-settled commonlaw meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree in the
definition as to which estimates might differ.' Cline v. Frink
Dairy Co.,. 274 U.S. 459, 47 S. Ct. 681, 685, 71 L. Ed. 1146.
It is not essential to the validity of the statute that it prescribe
the exact period of time within which (repeated and successive
transactions' must occur because they must be within a reason·
able time fixed by the common law in the light of all the cir
cumstances. The phrase (transactions of like character' in ils
context refers to sale of any security' mentioned earlier in the
same sentence. The dominant factor is (transactions', and not
the particular security. But the transactions must be confined
to sales of such securities as fall within the prohibition of
section 5 and are not excluded from its operation by section
3 (b) to (p) inclusive, or other provisions of said chapter
11 OA. The words like character' import resemblance in salient
features and not identity in all particulars. Bliss v. Bliss, 221
Mass. 301, 109 N.E. 148, L.R.A. 1916A, 889. Thus construed, we think that section 3 (a) is not open to the objection
of vagueness on constitutional grounds . . . ''
t

t

Following a consideration of the principles laid down
by the Court, which are expressions of the general trend of
authority, it is apparent that the question you have submitted
in your letter as to whether the subject section Hrefers to One
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sale only or if more than one sale,'' how much such sales could
be classified as isolated - may not be positively answered;
since it is evident that the number of the transactions is alone
not controlling in all cases, for it is apparent that other factors
may control such as the type of offer that is made by the issuer,
the question of the number of units offered, the manner of
offering and the relation of the issuer to the offerees. (Emphasis
added).
The Federal Securities Act, as amended, now provides for
an exemption of transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering, and, it is evident and apparent that it was the
intention of the Legislature of this State, when referring to
isolated transactions not being made in the course of repeated
and successive transactions, to distinguish an isolated offer
or sale from a public offer or sale. What could constitute a
public offering is essentially a question of fact in which all
surrounding circumstances are of moment. Of course, any
attempt to dispose of a particular security must be considered
as an offer, but if there are preliminary negotiations with a
substantial number of persons or prospective purchasers in
order to convince such persons of the value of the securities,
then, undoubtedly, such a transaction when consummated is
the termination of a public offering and could not be held to
be an isolated sale. Likewise, if the offering is restricted to a
particular group or class, if there is a large number of persons
in the group or class, the offering may be made to a sufficient
number of persons to constitute a public offering and not an
isolated transaction.
In the opinion of the General Counsel of the Securities
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and Exchange Commission, released January 24, 1935; it was
held that if the size of the offering or the number of units
involved is so small that there is very little chance of repeated
and successive transactions then there would be little probability of a distribution of the securities to the public generally
and such an offering may only terminate in an isolated transaction. In considering the manner of offering the security, if
the issuer enters into a few transactions with particular persons,
the few transactions may be placed in the realm of isolated
transactions more definite! y than in the situation where the
issuer engages a dealer or other machinery for the sale and
distribution of the securities rather than by direct negotiation.
As indicated in the case of Black vs. Solano, 114 Cal. App.
170, 299 P. 843, the fact that the securities may be sold as
a private sale is beside the point for it was held that it was
the manner of offering and not the type of sale which would
control; and, it was remarked in this opinion that the proof
of sales of like interest to other parties under all the circumstances, would have warranted the court in drawing an inference that the offer was made to anyone interested in a chance
to share in a promotional venture, and was controlling.
In the case of Ersted vs. Hobart Howry Company, 299
N.W. 66, the following precedent was established:
((Under statutory provision that Blue Sky Law shall apply
to (isolated sales' of securities by the issuer or owner thereof,
such sales not being made in course of (repeated and successive'
sales of securities of issue by same issuer or owner, the words
repeated and successive are used by way of contrast to (isolated', and in such context an (isolated' sale means one standing
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alone, disconnected from any other, and ~isolated and successive sales' mean transactions undertaken and performed one
after the other, and to sales of securities made one after the
other within a period of such reasonable time as to indicate
that one general purpose actuates the vendor and that such
sales promote the same aim and are not so detached and separated as to form no part of a single plan, are repeated and successive sales."
Therefore, it is my opinion that the question presented
may not be absolutely settled at this writing, but that the statute
involved and the principles herein set forth may only serve
to advise you of the various elements of particular transactions
which may be considered by your Commission in the determination of whether or not a particular transaction or series of
transactions is exempt from the provisions of the Act.
Yours very truly,

Is/ Grover A. Giles
Attorney General
AJB:bhl
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UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION
THE STATE OF UTAH
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SALT LAKE CITY
December 23, 1946
Mr. Lawrence Taylor, Director
Securities Commission
Department of Business Regulation
BUILDING
Dear Mr. Taylor:
You have referred to this office for an opinion, information
regarding a proposed issuance and sale of $500,000 in 5 per
cent debentures by Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company. You
desire to know whether or not it will be necessary for the
company to register these securities before offering them for
sale.
According to the information in the possession of this
office $200,000 of these debentures will be issued on January
1, 1947, and additional sums up to the $500,000 will be issued
from time to time thereafter. There will be no underwriter
of the proposed debentures and no commission will be paid
for the sale of the same. The entire issue is to be sold to the
stockholdders and officers of the McWane Cast Iron Pipe
Company in Birmingham, Alabama, of which company the
Pacific State Cast Iron Pipe Company is a subsidiary. No offer
of any kind will be made to the general public.
Section 82-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides in
part as follows:
{!Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions
of this chapter shall not apply to the sale of any security in
any of the following cases:
( 3) An isolated transaction in which any security
is sold, offered for sale, subscription or delivery by
the owner thereof, or by his representative for the owner's account; such sale or offer for sale, subscription or
delivery not being made in the course of repeated and
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successive transactions of a like character by such owner
or representative not being the underwriter of such
security.
The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply
in any case of sale where the issuer shall have taken
the entire stock of a company in payment for mining
claims, patent rights, copyrights, trade-marks, process,
lease, formula, oil lease, good will or any other property right or any other tangible or intangible asset
which may be construed as a promotion interest, or
where funds received from the sale of such security may
be used directly or indirectly for development purposes.''
It is the opinion of this office that in order to be an
isolated transaction it is not necessary that a transaction be
the only one of its kind. In order to determine whether or not
a particular transaction actually comes within this section, it
is necessary to consider the entire scope of the Securities Act.
This act was obviously made for the purpose of protecting the
public against the public offering for sale of securities which
do not offer a sound investment. The isolated transactions
exception was included because the Legislature felt that where
an offer was to be made only to a few individuals and not to
the general public, such individuals would probably be in
a better position than would the state to determine the backing
of the particular security involved.
Such is obviously the case in the proposed sale of these
debentures. They are to be offered for sale only to officers and
stockholders of the parent company of the issuer. Such persons
are obviously in a position where they know or should know
the backing of such securities. In view of the fact that the
offer is to be made only to these individuals and in view of the
fact that there are to be but a limited number of sales,this
office is of the opinion that this security need not be registered.
Very truly yours,
(Signed) Grover A. Giles
GROVER A. GILES
Attorney General
CLR:ki/sda
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